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The price of crude oil is discussed almost daily in the financial press and its evolution 
poses acute problems for policy makers everywhere. The oil price being still low in 2001, 
the next six years saw a steady increase that tripled the price by the middle of 2007. Later 
that year, the path of oil prices steepened sharply, sending the price to an all-time high on 
July 3, 2008, only to be followed by an even more spectacular price collapse (Hamilton 
2008, p. 1). Around the turn-of-year 2008/09, the oil price has started to rebound.  
It is also well known that oil producers have reaped enormous windfall profits 
from record oil prices. However, what is less well known and less widely reported is that 
oil producers also tend to save a sizeable proportion of their gains (Higgins, Klitgaard and 
Lerman 2006, IMF 2006, p. 75). This fact has one clear implication: an increase in the oil 
price will lead to an increase in the global supply of savings, and hence, at least 
potentially, also to lower interest rates. That savings from oil producers can have an 
important impact on the global supply of savings is clear from the raw numbers.  
For the year 2007 it was expected that the OPEC group of countries should have a 
current account surplus of around 300 to 400 billion USD, which corresponded to about 
one half of the US deficit and represented a large share of the total sum of current account 
surpluses, and hence also of the total amount of external savings which is available 
globally.
1 The Saudi Arabian current account position, for instance, moved from being 
broadly in balance around the turn of the century to running a surplus worth more than 
30% of GDP in 2008. If there were any hint that the rise in oil prices might not prove 
durable, it would make sense to save some of these gains (Broadbent and Daly 2009). 
Later on we will argue that the reason for the emergence of this surplus is quite simple: 
ever-rising oil prices transfer wealth from oil-consuming countries to oil-producing 
countries, and oil-producing countries have a higher propensity to save out of current 
income.
                                                 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1 summarizes changes in current accounts corresponding to changes in 
savings and investment balances. The current account position of emerging and 
developing countries improved by almost $670 billion between 2001 and 2008, while the 
current account position of the other countries/regions listed in the table deteriorated by 
some $500 billion. Within the latter group, the current account position of Japan rose 
until 2007 while that of the euro area deteriorated from 2004 on. Thus, increases in the 
current account surpluses of emerging and developing countries and Japan financed to a 
large degree the increase in the current account deficits of other countries.  
In general, the savings glut in the emerging world was in large part a result of 
policies that emerging market economies put in place when the global economy started to 
recover from the 2000-01 recession (Bernanke 2005 and 2007).
2 Since it was spurred by 
monetary and fiscal stimulus in the US, some call it the liquidity glut. The rise in the 
international supply of savings from emerging market economies (EMEs) combined with 
a fall in investment in OECD countries pushed real interest rates to record lows. The 
deflation scare that emerged from the combination of the bursting of the stock market 
bubble, the shocks that ensued from the corporate scandals and geopolitical events, 
combined with the entering of China and India into the world trading system, provoked in 
response a policy of aggressive lowering of nominal and real interest rates. An initial 
savings glut thus became a liquidity glut. 
China adopted policies that increased Chinese savings and restrained investment 
to try to keep the renminbi’s large real depreciation after 2002 – a depreciation that 
reflected the dollar’s depreciation – from leading to an unwanted rise in inflation. The 
governments of the oil-exporting economies opted to save most oil windfall – at least 
initially (Higgins, Klitgaard and Lerman 2006). Those policies intersected with distorted 
incentives in the US and European financial sector – the incentives that made private 
banks and shadow banks willing to take on the risk of lending to ever-more indebted 
                                                 
2 The argument posits that an oversupply of savings - particularly in Emerging Asia - helped to generate a 
US current account deficit as the savings had to flow somewhere, and the US was the willing recipient of 
the savings. -7- 
 
 
households (a risk that most emerging market central banks didn’t want to take) to lay the 
foundation for trouble. 
Seen on the whole, thus, savings rates rose substantially in the emerging world 
from 2002 to 2007, although it is quite unusual for Asia and the oil exporters to show 
large surpluses at the same time.
3 The main reason for the rise in emerging Asia’s savings 
is simple: China’s GDP rose relative to world GDP, and China’s savings rate rose relative 
to China’s GDP. The result was a very large increase in the aggregate savings of the 
emerging world – especially after 2003. The rise in the combined surplus of Asia and the 
oil exporters that followed the Asian crisis was around 0.5% of world GDP. The post 
2003 “China boom” pushed the combined savings rate of the oil exporters and emerging 
Asia up another 1% of world GDP. The net result was that the global economy prior to 
the crisis was characterized both by high levels of both savings and investment in Asia 
and the oil exporters and by high levels of consumption and low levels of savings in the 
US. Moreover, the major advanced economies began to run large current account deficits 
(see Broadbent and Daly 2009, Figure 6).  
The purpose of this contribution is to illustrate the mechanism by which higher oil 
prices might lead to lower interest rates in the context of a simple model that takes into 
account the global external savings equilibrium. The simple model has interesting 
implications for how one views the huge US current account deficit and how the 
emergence of China’s savings surplus and oil supply shocks impact the global economy. 
Moreover, we will argue that the lower real interest rates resulting from excess OPEC 
savings should have facilitated the adjustment to the subprime crisis. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the theoretical model is derived. For 
this purpose we have a closer look at the relationship between the price of oil and world 
output and the world supply of savings. But before we continue by deriving the world 
savings equilibrium in section 2.4, we check what could motivate oil exporters to save a 
large fraction of their current income. Section 3 contains some illustrations of the ‘sos’ 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Bernanke (2005). In 1998, the fall in oil prices helped Asia and hurt the oil exporters; in 
2000 the rise in oil prices helped the oil exporters and hurt Asia. And way back in 1980, Asia ran a deficit 
that helped offset the oil exporters’ surplus.  -8- 
 
 
(savings-oil-savings) curve as the global savings balance condition and section 4 presents 
some comparative statics with respect to two types of shocks: the emergence of China 
and an oil supply shock. In section 5, we arrive at some policy conclusions. 
2. The model 
The basic building blocks of the model are quite simple. First, we derive the relationship 
between the price of oil and world output. Second, we illustrate the world supply of 
savings. Third, we solve for the global equilibrium savings.  
2.1 The relationship between the price of oil and world output   
We start with the oil market and in particular with the demand for oil. It is assumed here 
that growth in world income and production leads, ceteris paribus, to an equi-proportional 
increase in the demand for oil and that the price elasticity of demand is rather low.  
Denoting income (in oil consuming countries) by the variable y and oil demand 
by the variable q the demand for oil can be written as:  
(1)  qd = y p
-      with   < 1,  
where the variable p stands for the price of oil.
4 The elasticity of demand with 
respect to the price of oil, denoted by  , is assumed to be low, and in any case smaller 
than one, as confirmed by many studies. Global demand for OPEC oil is sluggish due to 
the slow dynamics in demand
5 and non-OPEC supplies. 
In terms of the determinants of demand, Hamilton (2008), p. 1, notes that the 
price elasticity of demand is challenging to measure but appears to be quite low and to 
have decreased in the most recent data. The income elasticity is easier to estimate, and is 
near unity for many countries. Anyway, most studies of the oil market find a long-term 
price elasticity of demand of between 0.1 and 0.3 (Gately 2004, Gately and Huntington 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, our variable y denotes the deviation from the “normal“ growth path. 
5 Energy and in particular oil demand depends on appliances, their number and their technical efficiency. 
This existing stock of appliances limits short run adjustments to behavioral adaptations and implies that 
time constants of many years if not decades (e.g. thermal efficiency of buildings) characterize long run 
adjustments. See Wirl (2009), p. 5.  -9- 
 
 
2002). For instance, Dahl (1993) and Cooper (2003) arrive at long-run demand 
elasticities for crude oil of -0.2 to -0.3. Hamilton (2008) comes up with an estimate of the 
intermediate-run price elasticity of oil demand of 0.26. Hence, in section 3 where we will 
illustrate the ‘sos’ (savings-oil-savings) curve we feel legitimized to assume a parameter 
value of   = 0.25.  
The second element of the description of the oil market relates the price of oil to 
its supply. Here the crucial assumption is that, in the short run, the oil supply is very 
inelastic, especially if producers operate close to capacity, so that the market clearing 
price must grow at an increasing rate as demand nears the available supply.
6  This seemed 
to represent the situation as of end-2007 when the price was close to 100 USD per barrel 
as oil stocks fell to a historical low. The following (standard) functional form was chosen 
in order to keep the algebra simple: 
(2)  q
s = q0 p
       with   < 0.5,
 
where    denotes the elasticity of supply and the shift parameter q0 represents any 
other influences on the supply and, hence, the price for oil, as for example expressed by a 
political risk premium. The parameter   might become zero, especially if one considers 
oil as an exhaustible resource. In the latter case, the Hotelling rule applies, according to 
which the price of oil increases at the interest rate and the supply is constant (see 
Hotelling 1931 and section 2.3 of this paper).  
Setting supply equal to demand yields a simple relationship between the price of 
oil, p, and world output, y:  
(3)  p = (y/q0)
   , with     1/(  +  ) > 1 if   < 1 and   = 0. 
                                                 
6 The supply side faces substantial lead times for new oil fields, pipelines, alternative energy carriers, new 
power plants, etc. that limit short run expansions of output. There are enormous lead times between the 
initial discovery of a new oil reservoir and the time at which the new oil is actually being delivered to a 
refinery to use. These lags mean that, in the absence of significant excess production capacity, the short-run 
price elasticity of oil supply is also very low, another factor contributing to the potential price implications 
of supply disruptions (analyzed by us in section 4). See Hamilton (2008), p. 25, and Wirl (2009), p. 5.   -10- 
 
 
Note that in this case   = 0 is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for     
1/(  +  ) > 1 to hold.
7 Let us now derive the world supply of savings.  
2.2 The supply of savings 
The next building block describes the supply of savings by the two main country blocks 
within the world economy: the oil consuming economies (as proxied, for instance, by the 
US which displays the highest variation or, more generally, the OECD countries and, 
more recently, China) and the oil suppliers representing mainly the OPEC countries. 
Modeling the supply of (external) savings by the oil producing countries (OPEC) 
is straightforward. As mentioned above, OPEC member countries tend to save a certain 
fraction of their oil revenues. Thus, we have:  
(4)  sOPEC =  pq =  y 
 (1+  ) q0
 ( -1)  with   0 <   < 1 
This simple form reflects the fact that in OPEC countries domestic financial 
markets are underdeveloped. In these countries it is essentially the government which 
determines the use of oil revenues and, thus, also how much is saved. Fiscal policy is key 
here. OPEC revenues are equal to the product of the price of oil (as expressed by eq. (3)) 
and the quantity of oil supplied (for instance, eq. (2) solved for the equilibrium oil price). 
The fraction saved, denoted by  , is constant and, as already stated, exogenously 
determined by governments. As a stylized fact, it can be observed from the raw data that 
the savings rates of the oil producers vary sharply with the oil price (Gros, Mayer and 
Ubide 2006, p. 63). 
The advice of the international financial institutions like, for instance, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to oil producers is to save about half of their windfall 
gains from higher oil prices. If the oil price stays around $90 a barrel, oil producers will 
                                                 
7 “In other words, it is the confluence of demand and supply factors that determines the effects of shocks to 
the oil market” (Dvir and Rogoff 2009, p. 34).  -11- 
 
 
increase their current account surpluses by $200bn-$300bn a year.
8 However, in some 
cases, the strategy of some sovereign wealth funds more or less corresponds with the 
restriction   = 1. Interest rates therefore do not play, de facto, a major role in determining 
OPEC savings. However, it is a different question what role interest rates should play in 
the perspective of inter-temporal optimization of consumption paths.  
Modeling the supply of savings, i.e. net external savings, by oil consuming 
countries (here, the US or, more generally, the OECD countries and, eventually, China) 
turns out to be more conventional.
9 The savings supply depends on income and the real 
interest rate (i):  
(5)  sOECD  =  s0 –  y +  i  
where s0 represents an exogenous shift factor.
10  This could, for example, be the 
result of a housing bubble which leads to a lower savings rate - for instance via a 
perceived wealth effect and housing equity extraction, as was popular until the start of the 
credit crisis in the US. But this shift could also be the ‘China’ factor, i.e. the emergence 
of a huge external current account surplus in China, where financial markets are much 
less developed and thus interest rates might have little impact on savings and investment 
decisions. It is implicitly assumed here that OECD consumers do not increase their 
savings in response to higher oil prices. This assumption could be easily modified (Kilian 
2007, p. 9), but our essential results would not be affected as long as the propensity to 
save of OPEC is higher than that of the OECD. 
                                                 
8 See Higgins, Klitgaard and Lerman (2006). The question will then be: who is willing and able to run 
corresponding deficits? Apart from the US, there are only two regions large enough to contemplate a shift 
in the external position of this order of magnitude: the euro area and Asia (Japan and China).  
9 As an aside, one might note that there is indeed a marked difference between the EU and the US in terms 
of oil consumption: the US has been responsible for almost one-quarter of the global increase in oil 
consumption from 1994 to 2004, against less than 10% for the EU. See Gros, Mayer and Ubide (2006), p. 
60. 
10 Equation (5) represents a reduced form many people think about. Without loss of generality but also 
without changing the character of our results, it could have been explicitly derived by the NOEM three 
equations block. -12- 
 
 
2.3 Oil prices and OPEC savings 
Before we continue by deriving the world savings equilibrium in section 2.4, we 
investigate what could motivate oil exporters to save a large fraction   of their current 
income (see eq. (4)). One often cited reason is uncertainty about future prices (and hence 
incomes). Thus, the marginal propensity to consume may be very low in the short run. 
This might be partially the case because future prices exist only for at most five years.  
Moreover, the international financial institutions (IFIs) have been urging 
governments of oil-producing countries to build up stabilisation funds, advice that has 
been at least partially taken. This implies that governments are saving a substantial part of 
the windfalls that accrue to them in the form of higher royalties in order to raise national 
savings (Higgins, Klitgaard and Lerman 2006). These two mechanisms, both of which are 
based on the uncertainty surrounding future oil prices, are fundamentally very similar. 
However, there is another, simpler explanation why OPEC savings rates have 
increased: available reserves might now be much closer to exhaustion. This would 
explain why observed savings rates increase over time.  
Consider a country with a finite amount of oil, Q, which has already been found 
and where the investment in extraction has already been undertaken.  Denoting extraction 
in period t by qt it is clear that with  qt = Q the sum of production over time can just 
exhaust reserves.  Assuming that the lowest cost pattern of extraction is just to run 
production at current levels, extraction will just be a constant and will last for Q/q = m 
years, where m is the variable called usually years of supply.  
OPEC’s inhabitants have access to international capital markets. For them, the 
problem is thus to find a consumption path which maximizes their utility under the 
constraint that the present value of consumption equals the present value of oil 
production.  
The latter can be easily calculated given that production is constant for m years 
and then falls to zero:  
(6)  Pv = q  
m  pt(1+i)
-t   -13- 
 
 
Where Pv is the present value of oil revenues and pt denotes the price of oil in 
terms of the consumption good.  
For any individual oil producer the future price path is exogenous. There is some 
discussion in the literature on exhaustible resources whether prices should increase over 
time at the rate of interest or at a rate equal to the difference between the interest rate and 
extraction costs (see, for instance, Akram 2009). Here it is just assumed that prices are 
expected to increase at the rate r.  
The present value of the resource is then equal to:  
(7)  Pv = qp0  
m  [(1+r)/(1+i)]
t 
The consumption side is also straightforward: with infinitely lived consumers and 
the interest rate equal to the rate of time preference the optimal consumption plan is to 
keep consumption, denoted by c, constant, equal to the interest earnings on the present 
value:  
(8)  C = i Pv   
It follows that the savings rate of an OPEC country can be written as:  
(9)  S = (qp0 – c)/qp0 = 1 – i  
m [((1+r)/(1+i)]
t   
For the special case (Hotelling 1931) that r = i (the price of oil keeps increasing at 
the rate of interest) this collapses to:  
(10) S = 1 – im.  
This expression shows immediately that the lower m the higher will be the saving 
rate.  In practical terms this means that a country where oil can last (at current 
production) only twenty years will save much more out of current (oil) revenues than a 
country where oil is going to last much longer.  
This simple mechanism suggests that the current high savings rates of OPEC 
countries might constitute a signal that the producers themselves do not expect their 
reserves to last much longer. There is considerable uncertainty about the size of the actual 
‘recoverable’ reserves in places like Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern producers. If 
governments and consumers in these countries are consistently sticking to their high -14- 
 
 
savings rates, this might suggest that maybe their reserves are lower than often 
assumed.
11  
2.4 Global equilibrium savings – the role of the oil price 
Global equilibrium requires that external savings of the OPEC countries sOPEC equals dis-
savings of oil consumers sOECD. Combining eqs. (4) and (5) and multiplying the LHS with 
(-1) implies:  
(11)  -  pq  =  s0 –  y +  i 
Inserting now the equilibrium conditions from the oil market (eqs. (1) to (3)) leads 
to the following relationship between income and the interest rate:  
(12)   i  =  - s0 +  y -   y 
 (1+  ) q0
 ( -1)  
Hence, one is able to explain Ben Bernanke’s global saving glut at least partially 
endogenously by the increase in oil prices. The latter is one of the diverse forces which 
have created a significant increase in the global supply of saving which helps to explain 
both the increase in the US current account deficit and the relatively low level of long-
term interest rates in the world today, i.e. mid-of-2003 to mid-of-2008. Equation (12) 
reveals the relationship between income and the interest rate that maintains the 
equilibrium on the global market for external savings (and the market for oil). It is 
apparent that for the case of   = 0 (that is when OPEC has a marginal propensity to save 
its oil revenues equal to zero) this relationship becomes conventional: higher income 
level leads to higher interest rates.  However, with   being positive, the sign of the 
relationship between income and the interest rate could change: a higher income could 
lead to lower interest rates. This at first sight surprising result has a simple explanation: 
as demand nears available supply, prices increase and hence savings of OPEC increase as 
                                                 
11 There are many views (Matt Simmons’ 2005 Twilight in the Desert being the most prominent) that argue 
that the supply curve is kinked so that the years of plentiful and inexpensive oil supplies are over and that 
the future holds a much more difficult and expensive search for new sources of oil capacity. If one 
considers, in addition, that the likely sources of new capacity are in the areas of the world where 
geopolitical risk is higher, the view that supply will be available at the same conditions as in the past has to 
be qualified to a large extent. -15- 
 
 
well.  This mechanism might well describe the situation over the last few years when 
higher global growth (especially higher growth in the largest oil consumer country, the 
US) was not accompanied by higher interest rates. Part of the solution to the ‘conundrum’ 
of low long-term interest rates might thus be found in the reaction of OPEC (and of most 
other oil producing nations) to higher oil prices.  
A simple calculation can show that the magnitudes involved are significant. 
Around 50 billion barrels a day are produced by countries that are not themselves big 
consumers. An oil price increase of $30 a barrel (e.g. from $30 to $60/barrel) implies a 
transfer to these producers of about $1.5 billion per day, or around $550 billion per 
annum. If about one-half of this amount is initially saved, the increase in the oil price 
observed over the last year and a half is equivalent to a negative demand shock of about 
$250 billion for the oil-consuming countries. This alone would be equivalent to a drop in 
the investment ratio in both the US and the euro area of over 1% of GDP. Under 
reasonable assumptions, an oil shock could thus have a significant impact on the global 
savings-investment balance (Gros, Mayer and Ubide 2006, pp. 50f.). 
3. Illustrations – The ‘sos’ curve as the global savings balance condition 
Figure 1 below provides an illustration of the shape of the global savings balance 
condition - without loss of generality - for a particular numerical combination (  = 1, -s0 
= 1,   = 5,   = 1,  (1+  ) = 4 =>   = 0 and  ( -1) = -3 =>   = 0.25). Justifications of our 
parameter choice can be drawn from the preceding analysis.
12 For instance, we feel 
legitimized to set   = 1, since, according to section 2.2, the strategy of some sovereign 
wealth funds more or less corresponds with the restriction   = 1. Moreover, we choose   
= 0, since oil is an exhaustible resource for which, according to section 2.2 the Hotelling 
rule applies. Finally, we set   = 0.25, since, as a stylized fact, the elasticity of demand 
with respect to the price of oil is low.  
The curve representing the global savings balance condition in the interest rate-income  
space is strictly concave and it is henceforth called the ‘sos’ curve (savings-oil-savings). 
                                                 
12 We choose   = 1 just for simplicity reasons. Changes in the parameter values of   do not alter our main 
results.  -16- 
 
 
It relates a specific real interest rate on the ordinate to that level of income on the abscissa 
which - given the specific real interest rate - satisfies the global savings balance (Figure 
1).  
Figure 1 - The global savings equilibrium (with China) 
 
In Figure 1 we have derived the original version of the ‘sos’ curve. However, the 
location of the ‘sos’ curve is determined by a number of shocks. On the one hand, the 
‘China’ factor, i.e. the emergence of China’s huge external savings surplus, might cause 
an increase of s0 (in our numerical example the parameter s0  increases from -5 to -1). 
Because the shift factor amounts to -s0 in eq. (12), taking the China effect into account is 
equivalent to a parallel downward shift of the ‘sos’ curve in Figure 2. 
On the other hand, one could model the impact of a negative oil supply shock, i.e. 
lower supply, onto the location of the ‘sos’ curve. In our case, the shift parameter q0 
shrinks from 1 to 0.8. As a result, a negative supply shock (a fall in q0) would tend to 
move the ‘sos’ curve lower, but at an increasing rate ( ( -1) = -3 according to eq. (12) 
and our numerical simulation values (Figure 2).  -17- 
 
 
Figure 2 - The global savings equilibrium (with China): lower supply  
 
Note: The parameter s0 takes a value of  -1 when the ‘sos’ curve includes the China factor and a value of -5 
in case of the original ‘sos’ curve. In case of the lower supply ‘sos’ curve, the shift parameter q0 shrinks 
from 1 to 0.8. 
 
Equation (12) represents just the combinations of world GDP and interest rates 
that satisfy the global savings equilibrium. In order to close the model we use a standard 
IS equation which links (again valid mainly for OECD countries) demand to interest rates 
in a simple and standard way:  
(13)  y = f –  
-1i, 
where f is again an arbitrary shift factor. It could represent fiscal policy, or again, 
the impact of housing markets on consumption demand. The parameter   represents the 
semi-elasticity of demand to the interest rate. It might be higher in the US than in other 
OECD countries and zero in China, where, according to section 2.2, financial markets are 
much less developed and thus interest rates might have little impact on investment 
demand.  
Putting the last two equations (12) and (13) together gives the level of income 
determined by the global equilibrium in both the oil market and the market for external 
savings:  -18- 
 
 
(14)    (f-y)    =  - s0 +  y –   y 
 (1+  ) q0
 ( -1). y = 
           (   +  )
-1 [  f  + s0 +   y 
 (1+  ) q0
 ( -1)].  
Given the non-linearity in the oil market this equation cannot be solved explicitly 
for y, but it can be simplified to:  
(15)  y = (   +  )
-1 [  f  + s0 +   y 
 (1+  ) q0
 ( -1)]. 
In general, this equation might have two solutions: one at low GDP (and low oil 
prices) and another one at a high GDP level and high oil prices. The latter would be 
accompanied by lower interest rates.  
Graphically, the equilibrium is determined by the intersection between the (linear) 
IS curve and the (non-linear) global savings equilibrium condition (see Figure 3 below). 
Given that the IS curve is linear and that the global savings equilibrium relationship is 
strictly concave, there will always exist two points of intersection (or none if the IS curve 
is too high; in this case no equilibrium exists). Which of the two combinations of y and i 
which both satisfy the IS curve (demand within OECD countries) and the global savings 
balance will materialize in the market?  
The answer is suggested by the dynamics that are inherent in a system with two 
market determined prices (the price of crude oil and the interest rate) and a slower 
moving variable, namely output, and thus also employment in OECD countries. The 
system will thus always be on the global savings balance line, but maybe temporarily off 
the IS curve.  
At any point above the IS curve the interest rate is higher than would be warranted 
by the level of output, hence output will start to decline. This implies that the system will 
tend to move leftwards on the ‘sos’ line. The opposite will apply for combinations of i 
and y below the IS line. This implies that only the equilibrium with the lower oil price is 
stable.  On points on the ‘sos’ line to the right of the equilibrium with the higher oil price, 
world GDP will tend to accelerate driving the oil price ever higher (and global excess 
savings ever larger).Hence, we are in need to consider only one equilibrium. A closer 
look at the comparative statics of the model in the following section will contribute to a 
deeper understanding of these issues. -19- 
 
 
4. Comparative statics 
Given our complete and closed model specification, we can now perform the usual 
comparative static exercises to determine how the system consisting of the ‘sos’ equation 
(eq. (12)) and the IS curve (eq. (13)) reacts on different shocks. For illustration purposes 
we also need a particular numerical parameterization of the IS-curve. For the purpose of 
illustration, we set   = 15 and let  f vary in a range from 15 to 29.  
The first point to note is that any shift in the ‘sos’ curve displaces the equilibrium 
along the given IS curve, with the standard implication that an increase in income is 
associated with lower interest rates. However, when the IS curve shifts, the sign of the 
relationship between changes in income and the interest rate depends on where the IS 
curve intersects the ‘sos’ curve (Figure 3).  
Consider, for example, a shift to the right of the IS curve (e.g. the numerical 
realization of  f in eq. (13) is raised from 20 to 25 and then to 29) which might reflect an 
increase in OECD housing prices which leads to higher consumption demand).  
 
Figure 3 - The global savings equilibrium and shifts in the IS curve 
 




Note that these kinds of shift do not necessarily lead to higher interest rates. In 
this case income could go up, but interest rates could well fall if the intersection of the IS 
and ‘sos’ curve is located to the right of the maximum of the ‘sos’ curve. This might 
represent what happened when the US economy started to recover in 2004/5, but long-
term interest rates stayed very low. By this, our considerations might contribute to solve 
the so-called interest rate conundrum according to which it proves difficult to attribute the 
long-term interest rate declines solely to glacially increasing globalization (Greenspan 
2005). This aspect of our model fits the facts particularly well because a large part of the 
counterpart to the increasing US current account deficit came from OPEC surpluses until 
about 2004/5. The current account surplus of China had still been quite small (and also 
did not vary much) until about that time.  
But how does the emergence of China’s savings surplus impact the global 
economy? This important question is addressed in Figure 4. For this purpose, let us 
analyze the China effect alone and turn first to the ‘sos’ curve. As already derived in 
Figure 2, the ‘China’ factor leads to a parallel downward shift of the ‘sos’ curve. What is 
more, the IS curve shifts to the left, from IS curve I to IS curve III, because   and, hence, 
also the product  f which represents the constant of the IS curve equation becomes 
smaller if China is included. Again, this is because the parameter   represents the 
elasticity of demand to the interest rate which – as explained further above - might be 
zero in China. As a result, the new equilibrium is located at a lower interest rate but also 
at a lower GDP rate than without the China effect.  
What does the emergence of an increase in the supply of global savings imply for 
instance for the EU?  The increased supply of savings should keep interest rates low, but 
this does not require any particular policy reaction assuming it is properly recognized by 
the ECB.  The very large current account surplus of China is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, and it is not going to increase without limits.  Once it stabilizes Chinese 
imports will increase in line with exports.  China will thus not have a deflationary impact 
on the global economy forever (Belke and Gros 2007). 
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Figure 4 - The global savings equilibrium: the China effect alone 
 
Note: IS curve I: i = 20-15y; IS curve III: I = 15-15y. Hence, the realization of the product  f is diminished 
by 5 once the China factor is taken into account. The parameter s0 takes a value of  -1 when the ‘sos’ curve 
includes the China factor and a value of -5 in case of the original ‘sos’ curve. 
 
Let us now finally analyze the impact of a negative supply shock on the global 
savings equilibrium. Rising oil prices signal the increased scarcity of energy which is a 
basic input to production. Hence, rising oil prices can be indicative of a classic supply-
side shock that reduces potential output, as in Rasche and Tatom (1977 and 1981) and 
Brown and Yücel (1999). Consequently, the level of GDP is lowered.  
A negative supply shock (a fall in q0) would tend to move the ‘sos’ curve lower, 
but at an increasing rate ( ( -1) according to eq. (12)). With an unchanged IS curve this 
would then lead to a combination of higher oil prices, but also to higher income level in 
the OECD because of lower interest rates which stimulate domestic demand in the 
OECD region and to higher current account imbalances (higher OECD deficit and higher 
OPEC savings).  
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Figure 5 - The global savings equilibrium: negative supply shock 
 
 
5. Policy conclusions 
The simple model used here was just meant to illustrate a general idea, which should hold 
up in more sophisticated models such as, for instance, the New Open Economy Macro 
model as well. Our main result is that, provided oil prices stay high, an ex ante saving 
surplus in which surplus countries offer more savings than needed by deficit countries 
emerges. That should lead to lower global real interest rates (and/or higher asset prices – 
depending on the way petrodollars are recycled). Hence, the incipient excess of global 
saving over investment puts downward pressure on real interest rates which supports 
investment demand in oil importers and weakens incentives to save in oil exporters (IMF 
2006, p. 81). 
The purpose of this contribution was to illustrate the mechanism by which higher 
oil prices might lead to lower interest rates in the context of a simple model that takes 
into account the global external savings equilibrium. The simple model has proven to 
come up with interesting implications for how one views the huge US current account 
deficit and how the emergence of China’s savings surplus and oil supply shocks impact -23- 
 
 
on the global economy. Our paper implicitly even makes the argument that high oil prices 
may have just saved the world economy from the intensifying credit squeeze for a while. 
At least this view was valid until oil prices started to decline in mid-2008. But how so? 
The global economy has been hit by two shocks: the subprime lending crisis and 
high oil prices. The latter have faded into the background as prices have stabilized near 
record levels around the turn-of-year 2007/08. But it would be a mistake to underestimate 
their importance at that time. The recent surge in oil prices has made a rebalancing of the 
global economy more difficult, but it might in fact have facilitated the adjustment to the 
“subprime” credit crisis.  
The core of the issue is simple: oil producers tend to save about half of their 
windfall gains from higher oil prices. If, for instance at the turn-of-year 2007/08 the oil 
price would have stayed around $90 a barrel, oil producers would have increased their 
current account surpluses by $200bn-$300bn a year. However, the question in such a 
scenario always is: who is willing and able to run the corresponding deficits? Apart from 
the US, there are only two regions large enough to contemplate a shift in the external 
position of this order of magnitude: the euro area and Asia (Japan and China). 
The euro area would have no problem running a current account deficit of 
$200bn-$300bn (at exchange rates prevailing around the turn-of-year 2007/08, $300bn 
would amount to €200bn, or about 2.5 per cent of euro area gross domestic product). In 
an ideal world this could be achieved if domestic demand remained strong in the face of a 
strong euro. It seems, however, that domestic demand in the euro area is already 
weakening and is unresponsive to efforts to influence it with either monetary or fiscal 
policy.  
Asia, especially China, has until recently been determined to continue export-led 
growth (already preparing itself for the next post-crisis export boom). The Chinese 
authorities will not be able to defer a substantial appreciation of the renminbi for ever. A 
real appreciation is already happening via higher inflation in China, but this is a relatively 
slow process. It may take years before Chinese policymakers throw in the towel. 
Meanwhile, the most that can be expected is a reduction in the pace of increase of its 
current account surplus. -24- 
 
 
This prognosis implies, provided oil prices stay high, an ex ante savings surplus in 
which surplus countries offer more savings than needed by deficit countries. That should 
lead to lower global real interest rates. The rates of Treasury bills in the US prevailing at 
the turn-of-year 2008/09 were widely interpreted as a signal that recession has become 
more likely. However, it was just a natural consequence of the petro-savings glut. 
Factoring in petro-savings can also explain why the expectation that a fall in the dollar 
will lead to higher interest rates has not been fulfilled: as the dollar falls, oil prices 
increase and the oil based savings glut depresses interest rates worldwide.  
Moreover, countries in OPEC, the oil exporters’ cartel, are likely to invest at least 
part of their surpluses in US equities, as a proxy for the global market, thus sustaining the 
US stock market (witness the 2007 private deal between Citibank and Abu Dhabi). This 
has tended to mitigate the adjustment in US consumption as lower housing prices were 
offset by lower interest rates and sustained asset values outside the housing sector.  
Since the elasticity of domestic demand with respect to interest rates is higher in 
the US, the counterpart to rising OPEC surpluses should come again from the US, rather 
than the euro area (or Asia, where, according to section 2.2, interest rates have little 
influence on consumption). Thus, other factors apart, from this point of view growth had 
the potential to remain stronger in the US than in the euro area, which apparently had and 
still has difficulties compensating for the loss of its export markets with stronger 
domestic demand.  
Seen on the whole, the lower real interest rates resulting from excess OPEC 
savings should have facilitated the adjustment to the subprime crisis. This is because 
excess savings from the oil exporters keep real interest rates low and push asset prices 
back up.  In other words, the oil producing nations have generated far more income than 
they spend and thus have excess savings. The excess savings will be lent out to or used to 
buy assets from countries willing to live beyond their means, i.e., to run a current account 
deficit. Since the world economy has been weighed down once again by tightening credit 
conditions that have emerged from the subprime mess, this injection of excess savings 
has provided the needed infusion of funding to keep the world economy going. But why -25- 
 
 
is our analysis still relevant today although oil prices have come down significantly in the 
meantime and are only moderately increasing again?  
A first argument is that the next bubble is already looming on the horizon and the 
pattern described in the paper can reproduce itself. For instance, it is far from unrealistic 
that the current level of global excess liquidity will sooner or later again feed into higher 
oil and other asset prices after the velocity of money will have increased again. At least, 
exactly this is implied by the debate about the role of commodity (and especially oil) 
prices in setting monetary policy among economists which took place over the last three 
decades (Angell, 1992). For instance, Barsky and Kilian (2002) demonstrate that 
monetary fluctuations contribute to trace the historical pattern of the movements of prices 
of oil and other commodities (see also Frankel 2008, and Hamilton 2008a, pp. 42ff.). 
Second, the issues addressed and modeled in the paper could be analysed just in 
the opposite direction with signs reversed for a scenario of relatively low oil prices as, for 
instance, prevailing since the midst of 2008. We leave this task for further research. 
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